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New Types

First, he would deal with the subject of new types. With regard to the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, the area of agreement is now much greater than the remaining points of difference. The two sides were agreed in principle that there would be a ban on new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that each side would be permitted to flight test and deploy one type of ICBM, which may have multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles or single re-entry vehicles, as each side chooses. It was further agreed that the permitted new type will be a light ICBM as defined in the Joint Draft Text, and that there would be a limit on the number of re-entry vehicles on such missiles.

With respect to existing types of ICBMs, we were agreed that the number of re-entry vehicles on each such type of missile would be limited to the maximum number that had been flight tested on such missiles. Additionally, the sides had come very close to complete agreement on the limits in the modernization of existing types of ICBMs. As Gromyko had stated yesterday, the limitations on modernization already agreed upon and included in the Joint Draft Text provided a basis for a satisfactory solution. We believed that the Soviet proposal that the Delegations in Geneva be authorized to take on the task of making the definition somewhat more precise was a constructive one.

Additionally, the sides were in agreement that there will be no limit on new types of SLBMs, except that the number of re-entry vehicles on such SLBMs shall be no greater than 14. This is the maximum number that has been flight tested on any existing SLBM.

We had also proposed that the re-entry vehicles to be permitted on the one new type of ICBM allowed to each side should similarly be restricted to the maximum number of re-entry vehicles tested on any existing ICBM. In Gromyko's comments yesterday he had introduced a new, inequitable and unacceptable restriction which would limit the number of re-entry vehicles on the one new type of excepted ICBM to less than the maximum number tested on any existing ICBM. Acceptance of the Soviet proposal of a limit of six re-entry vehicles would leave the Soviet Union not only in possession of the only heavy ICBMs, but also with the only ICBMs with ten, rather than a maximum of six, re-entry vehicles.

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This is not only inequitable, but also totally inconsistent with the position the Soviets had consistently urged, that their heavy ICBMs should not be isolated as a separate category and subjected to different treatment. For example, the Soviet Delegation in Geneva was still resisting any inclusion of a separate category for heavy ICBMs in the agreed-upon exchange of a data base.

We would urge that, in the interest of avoiding the delay that this new and completely unacceptable proposal would create, the Soviet side abandon it and agree with us that the maximum number on the excepted ICBM be ten, which is the maximum tested on any existing ICBM.

Backfire

The Secretary would next turn to the subject of the so-called Backfire. In discussing new types of ballistic missiles, the Soviet side had repeatedly referred to the importance that, in its opinion, the U.S. has attached to its proposals on this question. He would note that Gromyko had repeated in just about every one of his meetings with us the same insistence that the Backfire question can only be settled on the basis of Soviet proposals. The Secretary believed it important that the Soviet side recognize that we too regard Backfire as an important issue, both strategically and politically. The President had asked him to stress this with Gromyko again.

We were, however, trying to take into account the Soviet concerns on the Backfire issue. Prompt and favorable Soviet response to the proposals we had presented on the other remaining questions could facilitate resolution of Backfire.

Cruise Missiles on Heavy Bombers

The Soviet Union was requesting that we agree to limit the number of cruise missiles per heavy bomber to a maximum of 20, and to ban cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads. We had explained our position that we cannot accept these limits in the absence of any controls over Soviet air defenses.

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In an effort to eliminate this as a point of contention, Paul Warnke had indicated to Gromyko in Moscow that we were prepared to provide the Soviets with a formal statement along the following lines:

US STATEMENT REGARDING ALCM FRACTIONATION AND ALCM
MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE WARHEAD LIMITS

Regarding air-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km:

- The United States hereby informs the Soviet Union that the United States does not, as a practical matter, have the capability to deploy, prior to the expiration of the Protocol, on December 31, 1980, airplanes which are each equipped for more than 20 such cruise missiles or to equip airplanes with such cruise missiles having multiple independently targetable warheads.
- The decisions of the United States relative to the deployment of such airplanes or such cruise missiles having multiple independently targetable warheads after the Protocol expires will depend on the levels and capabilities of Soviet forces, including air defenses.
- Any limits on the numbers of such cruise missiles or on multiple independently targetable warheads for such cruise missiles are issues which can be considered during the negotiation of a SALT THREE agreement along with such issues as limitations on air defenses.

It was our firm belief that this statement should remove the Soviet Union's concerns on this matter. It will dispose of this problem now and leave it as a subject for negotiations in SALT III.

Dismantling/Destruction and Protocol

There were also remaining differences concerning the duration of the Protocol and the timing of completion of dismantling or destruction of systems in excess of the agreed reduced level of 2,250. Gromyko had stated yesterday that our tying of the Protocol duration to the time for completion of dismantling or destruction was artificial and served no purpose.

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We disagree and continue to believe that the same end date is appropriate in order to permit timely agreement on further reductions in SALT III.

Previously there had been a substantial difference between the positions of the two sides. The Soviet side had proposed that the Protocol expire three years after entry into force, and that dismantling or destruction be completed over a period of 12 months from December 30, 1980. Our position has been that both the expiration of the Protocol and completion of dismantling and destruction should occur by December 1980.

With regard to duration, it should be noted that the term of the basic Treaty is not tied to the date of entry into force, but will end on a specified date. The same should be true of the Protocol as a basic part of the Treaty, but with a fixed earlier date of expiration.

In his meeting with Gromyko in Moscow, Mr. Warnke had explained our willingness to accept June 30, 1981 as the date for completion of dismantling and destruction to reach 2,250, providing that the Soviet Union agrees to a Protocol expiration date which would also be June 30, 1981.

This represents a six-month extension of our present position and a nine-month extension of our original position. Thus it is a significant move toward the Soviet proposal on this issue.

It is the aim of both sides to be able to complete and sign a SALT II Agreement in the near future. Accordingly, a June 30, 1981 Protocol expiration date is more than a reasonable move to accommodate the Soviet position on this issue.

At the same time, an additional six months which a June 30, 1981 date would provide for completion of dismantling and destruction would meet expressed Soviet desires for adequate time to complete these operations.

The United States position on these issues clearly responds to Soviet concerns and provides the means for fully resolving both issues.

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Cruise Missile Range

The Secretary said that we had made constructive proposals regarding the definitions of cruise missiles and cruise missile range. With respect to cruise missile range, the basic standard should be the maximum distance at which a cruise missile can effectively engage a target. This is reflected in the United States proposal regarding maximum system operational range, which would ensure that cruise missiles would not be able to engage targets beyond the agreed distances. In addition, the United States had proposed that there be percentage limits on the permitted deviations from a direct course. These two proposals represent a proper solution to the problem which Gromyko had not addressed other than to reject our suggestions out of hand.

In conclusion the Secretary wanted to say that we agree that the time has long since passed for tranquilizing statements. We have made proposals that provide an equitable basis for resolution of the issues that remain before us. We were now ready to hear Soviet practical counterproposals, and we will be ready to respond to them at the time of Gromyko's meeting on Saturday with the President.

(Minister Gromyko requested a brief recess in order to consult with his colleagues. The meeting resumed 20 minutes later.)

Gromyko said that he had carefully listened to the presentation made by Secretary Vance. He had to say that on first hearing he and his colleagues had not discerned any substantive change or anything new in the position of the American side as compared to its previous positions, including those presented at the time of Mr. Warnke's visit to Moscow. He had to tell the Secretary quite frankly that all this did not instill the Soviets with optimism. The large question remained whether the things the Secretary had told him would bring the two sides closer to the SALT II Treaty or whether it would make that agreement recede still further. This was indeed a big question mark. He would, of course, carefully study the considerations presented by the Secretary, but his first impression was that no shift had occurred in the U.S. position that could open up an avenue for overcoming the difficulties encountered and facilitate finding mutually acceptable solutions to questions remaining unagreed.

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Put in other words, the Soviet side did not feel that the U.S. side had reacted properly to the compromise solution the Soviets had submitted for consideration by the U.S. side. Many indeed have been the times that the U.S. had repeated that the most important thing, in its view, was that each side be free to develop, test and deploy a new type of ballistic missile, equipped, at the discretion of each side, with MIRVs or with a single re-entry vehicle. The Secretary had stressed this when he was in Moscow last, and President Carter had also repeated that thought. It had been said that if this major difficult question could be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both sides, that would ease the situation insofar as preparation of the Treaty was concerned. Now, however, the U.S. side was acting as if it had never made any such statements concerning the importance and seriousness of the question of new types of ballistic missiles. Although, to a certain extent, the Soviet side had grown accustomed to frequent shifts in the position of the U.S. side, this particular shift had especially attracted the attention of the Soviet side. Thus, he and his colleagues still did not feel that the U.S. side was manifesting a genuine desire to take practical steps to expedite preparation of the new agreement, or to take into account the time factor which did not necessarily always act as an ally in expediting preparation of the agreement; at times the time factor worked in the opposite direction. What had been said on the U.S. side today confirmed that conclusion.

In this connection, and without going into detail, Gromyko wanted to recall the main elements of the Soviet position, particularly since the Secretary in his statement had resorted to this method and recalled the elements of the U.S. position.

New Types

The first element was that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept the U.S. proposal on the question of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs, on condition, and only on condition, of agreement by the U.S. side to resolve all other issues, and above all those of cruise missiles on bombers, timing of arms reductions, and the TU 22-M (Backfire) issue, on the basis of Soviet proposals. Gromyko would also recall that the Soviet Union had once again displayed a constructive approach in moving toward the U.S. position in the question

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of establishing limits for the number of re-entry vehicles on new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. He had named specific figures; the Secretary was well aware of them, and there was no need to repeat them now.

Cruise Missiles

Gromyko thought that the Soviet side would have been fully entitled to expect a positive response from the U.S. to the Soviet proposals for resolution of the entire complex of questions dealing with cruise missiles. The Soviet side had presented appropriate rationale which appeared to be absolutely convincing for its positions on cruise missile range, on not differentiating between cruise missiles with nuclear warheads and cruise missiles with conventional warheads, on non-equipping cruise missiles with MIRVs, and on limiting the maximum number of long-range cruise missiles for which each bomber could be equipped.

Concerning this latter point, it should be especially emphasized that Soviet readiness to limit increases in the number of warheads on ICBMs of existing types in the process of their modernization was contingent on assumption of an obligation to limit the number of long-range cruise missiles to be carried by a bomber. The Soviet side had linked these two issues in the most direct manner, and had provided rationale explaining why it felt this to be absolutely necessary. The Soviet side was firm in proceeding from the premise that the number of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km which could be installed on a bomber--a bomber that would be counted within the MIRV aggregate, i.e. 1,320--must not remain unlimited. Gromyko noted that the Soviet side had made many moves toward the US position, for example in agreeing to have bombers with cruise missiles counted within the MIRV aggregate. He noted that the U.S. representatives here today had not been present during those previous discussions, but he recalled that this question had been the subject of lengthy and detailed consideration. Thus, it had been a very long and arduous road. Furthermore, the internal discussions on the Soviet side, aimed at deciding what to propose to the U.S. side on this score--to decide on what would be an equitable way of counting cruise missiles within the 1,320 aggregate--had not at all been easy. The Soviet side continued to believe that the most correct way of proceeding would be for the sides to reach agreement that for the entire period of the Treaty

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(Gromyko repeated and emphasized the words "for the entire period of the Treaty") the number of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km to be carried by one bomber be limited to 20. This was the maximum number the Soviet side could agree to go in seeking to facilitate a new Agreement. In truth even 20 missiles per bomber was too much. Why 20? Surely everyone present was well aware of the great destructive power of each such missile.

Nevertheless, in the interests of reaching agreement on this matter, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree that the provision limiting the number of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km on bombers be formulated in the Treaty in such a way as to enable the sides to install more than 20 cruise missiles on a bomber. He would explain what he had in mind: in the event of installation of more than 20 cruise missiles on a bomber, that bomber would have to be counted within the 1,320 MIRV aggregate with an appropriate coefficient. In other words, he was now advancing a "coefficient variant" for the solution of this issue. A bomber equipped for 21 to 40 cruise missiles would have to be counted within the aggregate as two MIRVed vehicles. A bomber equipped for 41 to 60 cruise missiles would have to be counted as three MIRVed vehicles, etc. He would ask the Secretary to give this variant proper consideration.

Gromyko repeated that the Soviet side continued to believe that it would be preferable for a bomber not to be equipped with more than 20 cruise missiles. That would be much more reasonable than to engage in the production of "fatter-bellied" bombers. However, as a step to facilitate agreement, the Soviet Union could agree to the variant for the solution of this problem which he had just cited. He would add, however, that the Soviet Union could not and would not agree to any increase in the number of cruise missiles on one bomber above 20, or, if it was equipped with 21 or more, it had to be considered in the coefficient variant. If the Secretary had an idea in the back of his mind that in the course of meetings the Soviet side could depart from this position, Gromyko would tell him now that this would be unrealistic. He suggested that both sides proceed from what was possible, rather than from what was impossible. He emphasized that he had not said "undesirable" but "impossible."

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Turning to another cruise missile issue, Gromyko said that there were no grounds for revising agreements reached regarding both the lower and upper range limits for cruise missiles under the guise of working out a technical definition of cruise missile range. Here he was referring to the proposal that had been recently so boldly presented to the Soviet Delegation by the US side--presented with a kind of boldness that had in the past characterized cavalry charges. The agreement reached earlier, to the effect that limitations apply to cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km, should remain in force. Of course, however bold a proposal made, it should not be made if it was totally devoid of all reason. He had referred to agreements reached earlier which the US side was now trying to undermine. What he had in mind was determination of cruise missile range. That range must be determined by projecting the missile's flight path onto the surface of the earth, with the missile flying in its standard design mode. That would be normal and reasonable, would not give either side any advantage, and would not deprive either side of anything at all. Any reference in the definition of cruise-missile range to taking into account horizontal deviations, which a cruise missile would make in the course of its flight, would deprive of all meaning the dividing line of 600 km which separates cruise missiles into two categories--those subject to limitation and those not subject to limitation. The American superbowl proposal to which he had referred concerned not only the lower range limit, but also the upper limit. As for the upper limit previously agreed for cruise missile range, i.e. 2,500 km, the desire of the US side to increase it by a certain magnitude under some pretext or other could not be regarded as justified from any point of view. He would say directly that this was absolutely unacceptable for the Soviet side. In that case, it would be better not to have any upper limit at all for cruise-missile range. The Soviet Union would prefer not to go this route, because it represented a breaking up of what had already been agreed. But, if the United States displayed such a carefree attitude toward matters already agreed, it would be best not to establish any upper limit at all on cruise-missile range. Of course, breaking up previous agreements would do nothing to embellish our negotiations. He could easily imagine what the US side would look like, if it came to light that after reaching understandings on certain matters the United States had decided to break these understandings and simply throw them into a waste paper basket. The Soviet side had so far not done anything so far (he repeated "so far") to publicize this, because in its

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view responsible negotiations, and in particular negotiations on so serious a subject as strategic arms limitation, must be subject to a certain ethic.

Gromyko wanted briefly to restate the variant he was proposing: as concerns the limit of 600 km, he would propose that the US side accept the Soviet proposal for defining cruise-missile range. That 600 km range was to include everything involved in the missile's flight (he repeated "everything," adding in a jocular vein, "even the coffee and tea.") As for the upper limit of 2,500 km, it was to be eliminated, i.e. there would be no maximum limit at all for cruise-missile range. They could go ten times around the earth. He thought that would be logical. If something had to be broken up, it would be best to break up the previous understanding in the direction he had stated.

Gromyko thought that he had provided a sufficiently detailed presentation of Soviet views regarding standards to be set for the limitation of various aspects of cruise missiles on bombers. He would add to this some considerations on the form that the obligations limiting cruise missiles on bombers should take. In this respect, the Soviet view was simply that everything must be regulated in the Treaty (Gromyko repeated "in the Treaty").

Air Defense

Further, there was no way to justify the attempts made to link this or other questions with the question of air defense. He had encountered such arguments on previous occasions, and had heard them set out again here today. Such a line of reasoning was not convincing, however. Air defense had nothing to do with this issue. It was a separate and independent question which had no bearing at all on the present SALT II Agreement being worked out. He would go further, and say that whether one talked about SALT II or of subsequent negotiations on strategic arms, the question of air defense was entirely separate and different, and it would be completely unfounded to build artificial bridges between strategic arms and air defense.. That was a contrived stratagem, and he did not know why the US side was resorting to it.

Form

Gromyko wanted to touch on one more aspect of cruise missiles in the context of the SALT II negotiations. All obligations

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limiting cruise missiles on heavy bombers must be included and reflected in the Treaty itself--in the Treaty and not in the Protocol or some unilateral statement. What reasonable man could explain why all provisions dealing with ballistic missiles were included in the Treaty, and then for some reason the question of cruise missiles on heavy bombers--a major type of strategic arms--had been taken out of the framework of the Treaty and included in the Protocol or in some unilateral document. No one would understand this, and the Soviets would not accept it. He expressed the hope that the US side would approach this question with a more objective understanding of its significance and importance. He hoped that this question of form would not be allowed to become an obstacle in the way of final working out of the Agreement.

Dismantling and Destruction

Gromyko turned to the question of dismantling or destruction--reduction of strategic arms down to the maximum agreed ceiling recorded in the draft Treaty. Even in the more flexible form presented by the US side, the Soviet Union would still only have six months to reduce its overall aggregate down to 2,250, because for the Soviets December 31, 1980 was the only possible date for initiating reductions. This was a date on which the Soviet side could not compromise. Gromyko stressed: "It's not that we don't want it--it's that we can't do it." The Soviets could not accept an earlier date for initiation of reductions. The date now proposed by the United States--June 30, 1981--for completion of reductions did not give the Soviets any way out of this predicament. Gromyko said that this matter would create a barrier to a Treaty. It was not this issue that could logically become such an obstacle. After all, here we were not speaking of building some new and dangerous type of weapon, but of dismantling or destruction of arms in excess of agreed levels. This process did not and could not create any kind of hazard or risk for the other side, whether reductions were accomplished within six months or within 12 months, and regardless of whether the starting date was December 31, 1980 or an earlier date as proposed by the US. There was surely no military danger here for the United States, and surely the Secretary realized this very well. It seemed to him that the sides must not allow a non-businesslike approach to this matter; they should rise above it.

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Backfire

Gromyko said the Secretary would probably be surprised if he did not address the Backfire issue. He would therefore restate the Soviet position. The Backfire was not a strategic weapons system--it was a medium-range weapon. Therefore, the Soviet side would have every right not to discuss this issue any further. The fact that the Backfire was a medium bomber was well known to the Americans--the military, civilian and political leaders. He also did not doubt that the Secretary knew that the Backfire could not be converted from a medium bomber into a heavy bomber. The Soviet Union had no intention of doing this, and this was perfectly well known on the US side. There were probably some people on the US side who took the position that it would be a good thing to keep this issue alive, to return to it over and over again and to maintain an artificially high temperature in the atmosphere surrounding it. In the Soviet view this was not a good way of proceeding in any negotiation. The Soviet Union could not and would not go any further than it had already gone with respect to the Backfire bomber. It was not prepared to go beyond the unilateral statement. In general, if the SALT negotiations were just beginning now, the Soviet side would probably simply refuse to discuss this subject. However, since it had agreed in the past to make a unilateral statement regarding this bomber, it would be prepared to go through with this procedure.

Gromyko said he would not now refer to other issues in view of the fact that the Soviet position on those other issues had been adequately presented in the past and most recently yesterday. In the final analysis, it was necessary somehow to limit the crucial issues to be discussed at each meeting and not to go over already agreed ground. The main thing now was to concentrate on those issues on which no agreement, or only partial agreement, or insufficient agreement, had been reached. He was convinced that the overall approach of the Soviet Union and its specific proposals relating to limitation of strategic offensive arms made it possible to keep the negotiations on a practical track, so as to complete them in the nearest future, provided, of course, that there was a reciprocal desire on both sides to do so. As for the Soviet Union, it certainly had that desire.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his remarks and said he would not retill ground already well plowed. He had very carefully listened to what Gromyko had said this morning. Obviously he would wish to study carefully what Gromyko had told him and

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thought Gromyko would want to do the same with respect to the remarks the Secretary had made. He would suggest, therefore, that they leave the situation this way; that would give both of them the opportunity of examining very carefully what the other side had said. He did want to repeat what he had said at the outset. He believed both he and Gromyko were agreed that the time had come to complete these lengthy negotiations and sign a SALT II Agreement. In respect to Gromyko's closing remark he would say that we, too, were moving in practical ways to achieve the objective both sides have of trying to reach a successful conclusion to the SALT II negotiations. He would suggest that they therefore conclude their discussions dealing with SALT for this morning. He did have one or two other items he would like to discuss with Gromyko, and would suggest that it was not necessary for all their colleagues, particularly those specializing in SALT, to remain. He was sure they had other things to work on and would therefore propose to excuse them.

Gromyko agreed.

(The following persons left the room: Datinov, on the Soviet side, and Ambassador Earle, Mr. Slocombe, General Rowny and Mr. Shinn, on the US side.)

The Secretary thought he might touch on two or three subjects. The ones he wanted to raise were, first of all, the complete test ban and our negotiations dealing with that matter. Secondly, he would propose to speak briefly on the question of our talks on conventional arms transfers, and third--the Middle East, where he would be happy to discuss with Gromyko the recent activities in the Middle East and answer any questions Gromyko might have. If satisfactory to Gromyko, he would like to start with a few words on the complete test ban.

Gromyko agreed, but thought that in the course of the talks they might touch on some other subjects as well.

CTB

The Secretary said that President Carter had asked him to convey to Gromyko his desire to move ahead expeditiously on these negotiations and to confirm to Gromyko that there was no change in our support for a complete test ban. As Gromyko knew,

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our two delegations were meeting in Geneva today to resume the CTB negotiations. Our negotiating team had instructions to press forward with the negotiations on the assumption that the Treaty would have a three-year duration.

The Secretary wanted to emphasize the importance we attached to the verification aspects involved in these negotiations, and especially the need to reach agreement on an effective national seismic station network. He wanted to note that during the coming round of talks the US Delegation would offer a new proposal regarding the number and locations of national seismic stations, that would be suitable for a three-year treaty.

He also wanted to express the hope that the Soviet Union would be able to give an early and forthcoming response to this and other elements of the national seismic station concept. Now he would ask Mr. Warnke to say a few words supplementing his own remarks.

Ambassador Warnke said that, as Gromyko knew, substantial progress had been made in the complete test ban talks, but one factor which had been delaying the negotiations was uncertainty concerning the duration of the Treaty to be worked out. The Soviet Delegation, headed by Dr. Petrosyants, had taken the position that it could not address the issue of the number of stations until the duration of the Treaty had been determined. As Secretary Vance had pointed out, our negotiating team had now been given instructions to work on the assumption that the Treaty would have a three-year duration. We will move promptly to put on the table our revised proposal on national seismic stations, and we hoped that the Soviet Delegation will be prepared to give positive consideration to that proposal.

Gromyko said that it would be very good if these long drawn out negotiations were brought to a successful conclusion. The Soviet Union definitely stood for conclusion of an agreement on a complete test ban. Had he understood the US pronouncements correctly, to the effect that the US was in favor of a complete test ban and not just a threshold ban?

Secretary Vance confirmed that this was correct.

Gromyko said that he had, of course, noted that the US side had initially "made a cult" of favoring a five-year term for the Treaty, and subsequently sharply zigzagged again and was now talking about a three-year term. For the Soviet Union

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either alternative would be acceptable. He was somewhat tempted to ask when the next zigzag in the US position would come, but he would restrain himself and not put that question.

The Secretary asked Gromyko to recall that the first proposal for a three-year term had come from the Soviet Union. The arguments presented had been very persuasive indeed, but then the Soviet Union had "zigged" to the longer period. He would not suggest that we were zigzagging but say that we had simply moved to meet the Soviet position; that showed how flexible we were.

Gromyko said that, obviously, he could not comment on the verification proposals the US would put forward. He would hope that they will be reasonable proposals and will not place obstacles in the path of reaching agreement. That was really all he could say about these proposals. He was aware that the representatives of the three countries were meeting today, and would only repeat that the Soviet Union stood firmly for an agreement on this subject. It would be good if it could be achieved, for it would inject a positive breath into the international atmosphere as a whole.

Secretary Vance agreed.

Conventional Arms Transfers

The Secretary wanted to spend a moment and mention our negotiations on conventional arms transfers. We had had several sessions talking about this important subject, and he had followed them with great care, as had President Carter. We believed this to be a very important question and he wanted to emphasize the importance we attach to these talks. He looked forward to the next session scheduled for December of this year. He would hope that Gromyko would give it his personal support, because it was a matter of fundamental importance.

Gromyko said that literally a few days before his trip here to attend the General Assembly, he had familiarized himself with the results of the Soviet-American meetings to date on this question. He could not say that much progress had been achieved in these matters. The negotiators were still discussing fundamental principles, as well as other principles ensuing from those. So far our representatives had not found their way out of this maze of principles or gotten down to discussing questions of a practical nature.

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Secretary Vance thought that the next session of the talks might deal with the question of whether a regional basis can be found to obtain some progress. Therefore, the talks will be important as well as practical.

Gromyko said: "Possibly." He would wish to see these negotiations take a practical turn as soon as possible. Of course, it was true that it was also necessary to agree on principles. In a word, the Soviets were definitely for continuation of these talks, and did not believe that this was a purely academic question. On the contrary, it was one of major political significance. It would be useful if our respective representatives who will take part in the talks arrive with thorough and purposeful specific positions on the basis of which agreed views could be reached. This was precisely how the Soviet Union would intend to conduct these talks. In a word, it would be desirable to proceed from algebra to arithmetic in these matters. He knew that our representatives were scheduled to meet in December of this year, and would suggest that he and Secretary Vance ask them to arrive there well prepared.

The Secretary said he would do so, since he was committed to these important talks.

Indian Ocean

Gromyko wanted to ask the Secretary for the reasons why the US side had completely ended our bilateral talks on the Indian Ocean.

The Secretary asked Mr. Warnke to respond.

Warnke recalled that, as Gromyko knew, the last round of Indian Ocean talks had been held in Bern in February of this year. At that time significant disagreement had surfaced in connection with the conduct of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa. It was our position that the Soviet arms supply in that area and its naval buildup were inconsistent with the objectives of our talks. Accordingly, at the completion of that round, we had not set a date for their resumption. At this time, of course, the arms control agenda was quite full, and we had not, therefore, arranged a date for resumption. We continued to believe that agreement between us to put an end to the arms race in the Indian Ocean was a desirable objective. President Carter

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had expressed his interest in this matter in a public statement. It was therefore our hope that we would find a mutually satisfactory date for resumption of the Indian Ocean talks in the not-too-distant future.

Gromyko said he would assume that the US side would inform the Soviets when it was ready to tell them what the near future will be. As for Warnke's reference to the reasons why the United States had interrupted these talks, they were not convincing at all. The facts indicated the reverse to be true. The Soviet Union had ended its arms supply to Somalia when that country had entered upon the path of waging war against Ethiopia. But, in general, if one were to approach this matter in the way the United States had approached it, one could not ever hope to engage in meaningful talks about the Indian Ocean, because at any given time either of our countries or the British or the French or the West Germans were supplying arms to some country or other in that area. He therefore believed that the reasons presented were contrived and hardly the reasons why the United States had broken off the talks.

The Secretary said that, as he recalled it, at that time the number of Soviet naval vessels in the Indian Ocean had been larger by a factor of one-third as against the past. That was wholly inconsistent with the concept of limiting the number of naval vessels each of us had in that area. He would note in all fairness that now the number of Soviet vessels had been reduced and stood at approximately the level before the massive support the Soviet Union had given Ethiopia.

Gromyko asked if the Secretary had looked at a comparison of Soviet vessels and US vessels in that area. Such comparison would evidently not favor the Secretary's position.

The Secretary said he had indeed taken a look at a comparison.

Gromyko continued to the effect that even if that were so, what has the United States been doing on the island of Diego Garcia? If the Soviet Union were to take the position that the Secretary was taking, it would have been the Soviet Union that would have suspended the talks.

The Secretary said that the number of our vessels had remained stable. We were continuing to complete the installations on Diego Garcia, but essentially our naval forces there were stable.

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Gromyko noted that the Secretary was talking only about the level of floating naval vessels, but he knew that one huge stationary vessel, i.e. Diego Garcia, must also be taken into account. Thus, if anyone had grounds to break off the talks, it was the Soviet Union. The reasons cited here were artificial and contrived. Of course, there was no obligation to disclose the real reasons, but what the US side had offered appeared to have been done for the sake of appearance. No objective person could agree with them. He would ask the Secretary to inform him whenever the US was ready to take a more reasonable stand. Of course, he was in no position to compel the US to resume the talks. Perhaps the talks had been rather confining for the United States. On the whole, that would be up to the US side.

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 The Secretary wanted to say that we would soon be in touch with the Soviets with a view to setting a new date for Indian Ocean talks. Such talks were not at all confining for us. As for bases, he would only mention Berbera, the installations in Ethiopia and the PDRY. In any case, we would get in touch soon, because our objective continued to be to reduce the arms competition between us.

Gromyko did not believe that the Secretary was so uninformed as not to know that the Soviet Union had no bases in that area. It did have naval vessels which called at various ports. The Secretary had started naming countries by initials; if Gromyko were to do so, there might not be enough letters in the alphabet to cover them all. He suggested they go on to other subjects.

Middle East

Turning to the Middle East, the Secretary wanted to express his regret over the unfortunate delay in the delivery of the message President Carter had sent to President Brezhnev at the conclusion of the Camp David talks, which reported the events at Camp David. Unfortunately that message had not reached President Brezhnev until Monday afternoon, and we regretted the fact that he did not have it available to him early Monday morning, as we had hoped. In that message the President had tried to describe the events at Camp David and the results of those meetings. Since that time the Secretary had not had an opportunity of filling in Gromyko, but surely Gromyko was familiar with the documents resulting from those discussions. The Secretary would be happy to answer any questions Gromyko

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had with respect to those documents, or to comment on his recent trip to the Middle East, if Gromyko thought this desirable or useful.

Gromyko wanted to ask one question: what attitude to the Camp David "deal" had the Secretary encountered on the part of Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan? Gromyko would like to hear this from the Secretary personally.

The Secretary said that the reaction to the Camp David discussions and the results in all three countries was that they wished to study the results of the meetings further, and to consult with each other before reaching a final conclusion regarding their attitude. Three subjects had been of principle concern to them:

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1. Failure to include any section on Jerusalem;
 2. The question of the 1948 refugees, the so-called diaspora refugees; and
 3. The question of whether the mechanism envisioned in the General Framework would be sufficient to ensure self-determination for the people in the West Bank and Gaza.

In addition, President Asad had pressed the Secretary at some length regarding the intent of the General Framework. He had wanted to know whether the objective of the General Framework was to arrive at a comprehensive settlement. The Secretary had answered him in the affirmative, and had taken him through the documents, pointing out that the first paragraph of the substantive section of the General Framework said in unequivocal terms that the goal was a settlement in accord with all the principles of Resolution 242 and the legitimate interests of the Arab people. In addition, President Asad had made it very clear that he believed that President Sadat had made a separate peace which was harmful to the cause of Arab solidarity. That statement had repeated the statement Asad had made at the meeting of the Steadfastness Front just a few hours before the Secretary's arrival.

The initial draft had contained a section on Jerusalem. The Secretary pointed out that agreement had been reached on a number of items, such as that Jerusalem was not to be a divided

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city again, that there would be free access to the holy places of each religion, and that representatives of each respective religion would have full authority and control of their respective holy places, etc. On the question of sovereignty we had run into a stone wall. It had proved impossible to resolve their differences, and as a result the parties had decided not to include a section on Jerusalem in the General Framework. Instead, the views of the parties and the United States had been stated in separate letters which had been made public. In all frankness, the Secretary could not say that he was happy with this omission of Jerusalem from the General Framework.

On the question of the 1948 refugees the agreements merely provided in general terms that the parties would work together to bring about a just solution to the refugee problem. We in the United States did not believe this to be sufficient, and President Carter had emphasized this as a problem in his speech to Congress. The Secretary said that he would probably comment on this matter, which was important and needed to be resolved promptly, in what he would say in the General Assembly tomorrow.

Finally, on the third question: as Gromyko knew, the documents provided for setting up a mechanism to determine the final status of the West Bank and its relationship to its neighbors. There would also be a mechanism for negotiating the outstanding issues, to be resolved in a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. These two questions were intertwined, and therefore the document envisaged a single set of negotiations with two committees working in parallel. The mechanism also provided that this process was to be completed by the end of the transitional period of five years. Further, it was envisaged that representatives of the Palestinians would work in these two committees. This same section of the General Framework provided that as soon as possible (in the Secretary's judgement in a few months, perhaps three or four) there would be established for the interim period a Self-Governing Authority with full autonomy to govern the West Bank. The people that would be elected to that Self-Governing Authority would be residents of the West Bank, and that meant anyone, regardless of his political affiliation, could put his name forward to be elected. People affiliated with the PLO would be as free to put their names forward as any other resident of the West Bank. At the time that the Self-Governing Authority takes over, the Israeli Military Government in all its aspects would be withdrawn.

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The Secretary noted that he had provided a long answer to Gromyko's question.

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 Gromyko said that he appreciated the information the Secretary had given him. As for the substance of the Camp David agreement, he had to say at the very outset that the Soviet Union was vigorous in its disapproval of the agreement and, even more, condemned it. The Soviets did not believe that this was a step toward peace in the Middle East. They were convinced that considerations of a temporary nature had gained the upper hand as far as the United States was concerned. As for Sadat, he had proved long ago that he had a weak political backbone. Here he had capitulated. As for Israel, it had really obtained something that did not belong to it. Israel had committed aggression, and justice demanded that it evacuate all the lands it had occupied. Only on the basis of restitution of all the territories taken away from the Arabs, along with arrangements to ensure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, could a just settlement of the problem be obtained and a just and lasting peace be established in the Middle East. A just settlement would be equally advantageous for all the parties in the Middle East, the Arabs as well as the Israelis. For its part, the Soviet Union had always stood up for Israel's right to exist as an independent state, and the Israeli leaders knew this full well. As for the Arab world, it was divided, but, Gromyko would ask, in what way? It had turned out that it was Egypt that found itself in total isolation as a result of its policy of capitulation. Of course, there were some other states that were undecided or hesitant, but as a whole the Arab world could be said to be against Arab territories belonging to someone else. The Arab world was also united in favor of protecting the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, in favor of a genuine, and not an illusory, peace. The Soviets believed that in the end the Arab people, the Arab world, will win. Of course, at this point, no one could predict the timing or the specific form in which this will happen. But, surely the Arabs will not reconcile themselves to losing their territories as a result of an imposed and one-sided settlement. The present settlement could not be considered as leading to peace in that area.

This, in general, was the view of the Soviet Union, and this is what Gromyko had wanted to bring to the Secretary's attention. President Brezhnev had set this forth in his speech and had considered it necessary for Gromyko to set forth the Soviet position during this private meeting with the Secretary.

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The Secretary wanted to comment briefly. He had read Gromyko's speech, and also knew what President Brezhnev had said. He would like to comment as follows:

First, regarding withdrawal from occupied territory. Under the Sinai Accord, Israel will withdraw from all occupied territories in the Sinai up to the international boundary. Secondly, the principle of withdrawal in accordance with Resolution 242 applies on all fronts. The documents make mention of Resolution 242 in all its parts, and speak of non-acquisition of territory by war. The question of Palestinian legitimate rights is dealt with in the document, in the section dealing with the West Bank and Gaza. It states that the solution must recognize the legitimate rights and requirements of the Palestinian people. Further, a process is initiated to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and, finally, the Secretary would stress again that what is contemplated is a comprehensive settlement that would provide for all the parties eventually to resolve their differences in negotiations in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 242.

The Secretary said he was not suggesting that the Camp David agreements were perfect, or that they included everything we would have liked to see them include. He did believe, however, that they were a major step on the road toward peaceful resolution of the Middle East problems and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Gromyko said that, as for Sinai, the Soviets had their own understanding of the situation. He could not agree with what the Secretary had said regarding Sinai. Sadat had not achieved any kind of sovereignty over the Sinai. Sovereignty meant the right to dispose fully over one's own territory, but Sadat had not achieved that. As for references to Resolution 242, they had no meaning, because each party had its own interpretation of what 242 meant. The US had its own interpretation, Israel had its own and Egypt and the others had their own. He had to note that there was not much difference between the interpretation of the US and that of Israel. Israel had always proceeded from the premise that 242 does not mean that it must give up all occupied Arab territories. In fact, after Camp David Begin had said as much. The United States appeared to take the same position. As for Sadat, he had well demonstrated what he had done by his conduct after the Camp David meeting.

Gromyko thought that they could end their discussions at this point.

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The Secretary noted that Gromyko had not recalled the US position correctly. The US position has always been and remains that Resolution 242 means withdrawal to the 1947 borders with minor rectifications.

Gromyko noted that Israel had always understood the word "minor" in its own way. One only needed to take a look to see what Camp David did to the West Bank.

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Approved: EUR/BOV: WShinn, ^{WS}Dr.
(SALT portion)
S/MS: MShulman (remaining portion)

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